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Posterior Beta and Anterior Gamma Oscillations
Predict Cognitive Insight
Bhavin R. Sheth1,2*, Simone Sandku¨hler3*,
and Joydeep Bhattacharya2,3,4*
Abstract
& Pioneering neuroimaging studies on insight have revealed
neural correlates of the emotional ‘‘Aha!’’ component of the
insight process, but neural substrates of the cognitive compo-
nent, such as problem restructuring (a key to transformative
reasoning), remain a mystery. Here, multivariate electroenceph-
alogram signals were recorded from human participants while
they solved verbal puzzles that could create a small-scale expe-
rience of cognitive insight. Individuals responded as soon as
they reached a solution and provided a rating of subjective
insight. For unsolved puzzles, hints were provided after 60 to
90 sec. Spatio-temporal signatures of brain oscillations were
analyzed using Morlet wavelet transform followed by explor-
atory parallel-factor analysis. A consistent reduction in beta
power (15–25 Hz) was found over the parieto-occipital and
centro-temporal electrode regions on all four conditions—(a)
correct (vs. incorrect) solutions, (b) solutions without (vs. with)
external hint, (c) successful (vs. unsuccessful) utilization of the
external hint, and d) self-reported high (vs. low) insight. Gamma
band (30–70 Hz) power was increased in right fronto-central and
frontal electrode regions for conditions (a) and (c). The effects
occurred several (up to 8) seconds before the behavioral
response. Our findings indicate that insight is represented by
distinct spectral, spatial, and temporal patterns of neural activity
related to presolution cognitive processes that are intrinsic to
the problem itself but not exclusively to one’s subjective
assessment of insight. &
INTRODUCTION
Most daily problems are solved by using sequential
reasoning or a ‘‘plug-and-chug’’ approach by applying
previously learnt concepts or methods. However, an
important subclass of problems can only be solved by
an insight (also known as Eureka or ‘‘Aha!’’), a process
by which a problem solver abruptly, through a quantum
leap of understanding with no conscious forewarning,
moves from a state of not knowing how to solve a
problem to a state of knowing how to solve it (Schooler,
Fallshore, & Fiore, 1995; Mayer, 1992). Thus, insight is
not an incremental but a transformative step during
problem solving, which requires successful restructur-
ing or reformulation of the problem (Duncker, 1945).
Cognitive insight is arguably at the core of human in-
telligence (Hebb, 1949).
How does one characterize insight? One way is to rely
on the problem solver’s subjective or personal feeling of
‘‘Aha!’’ after they solve the problem; another is to ob-
jectively classify a solution on the basis of cognitive pro-
cesses. For a solution to be classified as insightful, the
following three features are key: mental impasse (Fleck
& Weisberg, 2004), restructuring or the creation of a
novel and nonobvious representation (Ohlsson, 1992),
and parsimony of solution in terms of an economical
manipulation of available operators that leads to a dra-
matic decrease in solution path length (Schilling, 2005).
To understand the neural processes underlying in-
sight, Luo and colleagues presented one-liner riddles to
participants in their study and investigated the answer
presentation and comprehension period in event-related
functional magnetic resonance imaging or fMRI (Luo &
Niki, 2003) and event-related electroencephalogram or
EEG (Mai, Luo, Wu, & Luo, 2004) paradigms. The fMRI
study found enhanced activation of the right hippocam-
pus and the EEG study reported more negative postre-
sponse event-related potentials for the ‘‘Aha!’’ condition
than for the no-‘‘Aha!’’ condition in midfrontal cortex.
Another study on insight (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) uti-
lized a remote association task (Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2003), which is akin to lexical search. Solutions were
classified by the solver’s assessment of insight, which
was earlier explained to them as a kind of ‘‘Aha!’’ feeling
characterized by suddenness and obviousness. EEG re-
vealed a burst of 40 Hz gamma frequency band activity
in the right temporal brain region beginning 300 msec
prior to response.
These pioneering studies revealed interesting neural
correlates of the ‘‘Aha!’’ phenomenon; however, each
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had limitations. For instance, firstly, Mai et al. (2004) and
Luo and Niki (2003) addressed the neural basis of what
we term ‘‘outsight,’’ not true insight: Insight is when
the solver achieves a solution in his or her own mind
(Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995),
whereas outsight is when the person eventually under-
stands the provided solution (as in understanding the
punchline of a joke). Therefore, it is possible that insight
and outsight have different neural substrates. Secondly,
the gamma bursts observed on insightful solutions (Fig-
ure 4 in Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) were actually stronger
in the postsolution period than in the time period just
prior to the solution. Therefore, these gamma bursts
possibly reflect affective processes, namely, the under-
lying joy or sense of relief that typically follows solutions
involving ‘‘Aha!’’ (Gick & Lockhart, 1995), rather than
cognitive processes that lead to the solution and the
ensuing ‘‘Aha!’’. Thirdly, transformative thinking neces-
sary for insight emerges when two or more conceptually
disparate knowledge domains are linked (Terzis, 2001),
whereas remote association task calls for verbal fluency
and is probably confined to the lexical domain.
Thus, there remains the need for an analysis of neural
activity that (a) directly reflects the cognitive processes
leading up to a solution (presolution cognitive processes
as opposed to postsolution affective processes) of (b)
problems that an individual solves internally (true in-
sight as opposed to outsight) by a (c) transformative
step of reasoning spanning otherwise unconnected
knowledge domains (interdomain as opposed to intra-
domain associations), including the processes that com-
prise problem restructuring.
Therefore, in this study, we designed a multivariate
EEG study of humans as they attempted to solve open-
ended candidate insight problems that can be solved
with a transformative step of reasoning. EEG, with its
excellent millisecond resolution, is well suited to ana-
lyze the neural activity underlying complex cognitive
processes such as problem solving. We analyzed the
oscillatory contents of the induced neural activity that
directly reflects the cognitive processes leading up to an
internally generated solution during problem solving.
Large-scale neural oscillations have been implicated
in complex cognitive tasks (Grabner, Fink, & Neubauer,
2007; Krause, Pesonen, & Hamalainen, 2007; Razumnikova,
2007; Raghavachari et al., 2001; Jausovec & Jausovec,
2000).
We hypothesize the following. First, we expect that
the most robust signature of cognitive insight will be
found in the high frequencies as oscillations in the beta
(13–30 Hz) and gamma (>30 Hz) bands provide a
general platform for integration of neuronal information
belonging to sensory and cognitive processes (Engel,
Fries, & Singer, 2001; Tallon-Baudry & Bertrand, 1999).
Second, weaker beta band responses in the posterior
brain regions corresponding to insight: Transformative
thought is characterized by efficient retrieval of informa-
tion from various knowledge domains stored in memory
and focused concentration or attention to the problem
at hand; event-related desynchronization (ERD) of the
beta frequencies prominent over parietal areas is ob-
served under conditions of high memory load during
encoding and retrieval (Pesonen, Hamalainen, & Krause,
2007; Pesonen, Bjornberg, Hamalainen, & Krause, 2006;
Bastiaansen, van der Linden, Ter Keurs, Dijkstra, &
Hagoort, 2005). Third, stronger gamma band (>30 Hz)
responses in the right frontal brain regions corre-
sponding to insight: Right frontal dominance is observed
in the case of open-ended problems that require re-
structuring (Goel & Vartanian, 2005)—which is, as de-
scribed above, a key feature of insight. Fourth, the
change in neural activity underlying the transformative
thought process must precede the moment of decision
or response by several seconds: Insight is likely to
consist of both conscious and unconscious cognitive
processes (Kihlstrom, 1995); breakdown of the mental
impasse and the restructuring that follows the impasse
are finally followed by an ‘‘Aha!’’ moment when ‘‘every-
thing comes together.’’
METHODS
Participants
Eighteen paid participants (10 men, 8 women; age
range = 18–29 years, mean = 21.2 years) with no history
of sleep or any other neurological disorders were re-
cruited from the student population at the California
Institute of Technology.
Stimuli
Sixteen brainteasers, or verbal puzzles with practical
content, were chosen from known problem books and
magazines (Gardner, 1978, 1982) (also see supplemen-
tary information) as candidate insight problems. Each
puzzle was carefully selected with the following criteria:
(1) Specialized knowledge or expertise was not re-
quired to solve the puzzles.
(2) There was no set procedure to successfully solve
the puzzles—A transformative step of thinking was
required. A ‘‘plug-and-chug’’ approach led to a dead
end.
(3) Each puzzle was simple to understand; a single in-
sight, and not a series of insights, was required to
solve it.
(4) The puzzles were not well known. The participants
in our study knew the problems less than 2% of the
time. We discarded these rare trials from our
analysis.
(5) Writing tools (pen and paper) were neither re-
quired nor provided to solve the puzzles.
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An example puzzle is given here:
Problem: There are three on–off light switches on
the wall of the first floor of a building. One of the
switches controls an incandescent bulb in a lamp on
the third floor of the building. The bulb is initially
off. The other two switches do not control the bulb or
anything else (they are disconnected). You are
allowed to toggle the switches as many times as you
want and for as long as you want. How can you find
out which one of the three switches turns the light
bulb on and off?
The only constraint is that you can walk only once
to the third floor to check on the light bulb.
Hint: Keep one of the switches on for an hour and
then turn it off.
Solution: You turn the first switch on and leave it
on for an hour. Then you turn it off and turn the
second switch on, leave the third switch in the off
position, and you go upstairs. If the bulb is on, then
it’s switch number two, which is the one that’s on. If
the bulb is off and it’s cold, then it is switch number
three (the switch you never touched) that controls
that light. If the bulb is off but it’s hot, then it is switch
number one.
The default approach toward solving the puzzle is to
visually inspect the light bulb, which is likely to fail.
Instead, a ‘‘multisensory’’ approach is required to solve
the puzzle: Information from the tactile sense must be
combined with that from vision. This is, we presume, a
critical transformative step of thinking, making puzzles
such as this ideal for the study of insight (Sternberg &
Davidson, 1995; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987).
Behavioral Procedure
Problems were presented on a Macintosh G4 running
MATLAB and EEG recordings were stored on a PC. The
two computers were connected via a serial port, allow-
ing event triggers to be marked on the EEG record.
The participant sat comfortably in a chair at a fixed
distance from the monitor on which the problem was
presented. Upon solving the problem, the participant
had to provide an insight rating (10: maximum feeling
of insight; 0: no feeling of insight). Prior to the exper-
iment, the participant was told that a feeling of insight
is a kind of ‘‘Aha!’’ characterized by suddenness and
obviousness of the solution (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).
Prior to introduction of the test puzzles, three prac-
tice puzzles helped familiarize participants with the
procedure.
Figure 1 shows the flowchart of a single trial. In brief,
a trial began with the participant hitting a keyboard key
designated as ‘‘go.’’ This caused the puzzle statement
to appear and the participant had 30 sec to read it.
Afterward, a question statement was presented and the
participant had 60 to 90 sec to solve the puzzle. If the
participant could not produce a solution within this pre-
scribed time, a hint appeared and another 60 to 90 sec
was allowed to solve the puzzle. The hint was an implicit
or first-order hint (Gick & Lockhart, 1995), which pro-
vided some general direction but did not reveal the
solution. In essence, the hint, if successfully utilized,
constrained the search process to a subspace of the
problem space.
We asked participants not to mentally check their
proposed solution but rather to respond as soon as a
solution emerged; this isolated the moment of subjec-
tive insight as much as possible. Participants hit a
designated ‘‘stop’’ key as soon as they solved the puzzle
within the prescribed time. Then, they provided a rating
of insight and verbalized their proposed solution. The
experimenter verified its correctness. Breaks were pro-
vided between puzzles.
EEG Recordings
EEG signals were collected using a 32-channel EEG sys-
tem (ActiveTwo, BioSemi Inc.). Electrodes were placed
using the extended International 10–20 System (Jasper,
1958). The sampling frequency was 256 Hz. EEG signals
were recorded with a band-pass filter setting of 0.16 to
100 Hz. EEG signals were algebraically re-referenced
against averaged earlobes and were divided into three
segments: (i) initial 30-sec time period from puzzle
onset, (ii) intermediate 20-sec time period containing
hint (10 sec before and after hint presentation), and (iii)
final 31-sec time period (30 sec before the response
followed by 1 sec). We utilized an extended temporal
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) algorithm to
remove eye artifacts from these EEG segments in a
semiautomated manner (Nicolaou & Nasuto, 2003). The
criteria for rejection of components were: (i) sparsely
distributed ICA components, (ii) short-range linear
trends, and (iii) nonstationary time courses of the stan-
dard deviations of the ICA components. Afterward, we
visually screened the signals and manually edited the
contaminated ICA components. Any segment still con-
taining amplitudes exceeding 80 AV was removed from
further analysis. Four individuals were removed due to
excessive artifacts or disinterest in the experiment.
Depending on solution, utilization of hint, and the
participant’s own insight rating, we categorized experi-
mental trials into eight conditions as follows: (i) correct
solution (HIT), (ii) incorrect or false-positive solution
(FP), (iii) successful hint (SH) leading to a correct
solution, (iv) unsuccessful hint (UH) leading to an
incorrect solution or miss, (v) subjective high rating
(HR) of insight, (vi) subjective low rating (LR) of insight,
(vii) hit with no prior hint (nH_HIT), and (viii) posthint
hit (H_HIT).
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Data Analysis
To estimate the time-varying spectral content in the
EEG signal, the original signal x(t) was convolved with
scaled and translated complex Morlet wavelets v(t)
with a Gaussian shape in both the time (SD = st) and
the frequency domains (SD = sf) around frequency
v : vðtÞ ¼ exp  t
2
2s2t
 
expði2pvtÞ:
The wavelet family is characterized by a constant ratio
v/sf = 7, with sf = 1/(2pst). The center frequency v
ranged from 1 to 70 Hz in 1-Hz steps. Thus, all standard
EEG frequency bands, namely, delta, theta, alpha, beta,
and gamma, were analyzed. The time-varying energy of
the signal at time j and frequency v, E(j, v) is defined
as E(j, v) = j(v  x)(j)j2, where  represents the con-
volution operator.
The first 2 sec of the statement reading time period
(see Figure 1) were used as a baseline. For each partici-
pant, the mean ratio R(j, v) in decibels between the
energy of the trials and that of the baselines was given by:
Rðj;vÞ ¼ 10log10
YN
i¼1
Eiðj;vÞ
 !1=N24
3
5
10log10
YM
j¼1
ejðvÞ
 !1=M24
3
5;
where N is the total number of trials, M the total number
of baselines and ej(v) is the mean energy of the 2-sec
baseline period of baseline j. R indicates the amount of
increase (or decrease) in the oscillatory content of
induced EEG brain responses during task/trial-related
processing with respect to baseline. Because we selected
artifact-free baseline and task segments separately, N
and M could be unequal.
Task Comparisons
Time–frequency representation (TFR) analyses with
baseline corrections were performed for all eight con-
ditions and then we conducted four pairwise compar-
isons of conditions. One of the two conditions in each
comparison engaged more strongly transformative
thought processes. Whereas the EEG signals underlying
each comparison are unique, we reasoned that the
shared features among them would be reliable and gen-
eralizable neural signatures of transformative reasoning.
The four comparisons are the following. (1) HITs
versus FPs: We contrasted neural TFRs over a 10-sec
pre-response period for trials on which the participant
generated a correct, insightful solution (HIT) versus
trials on which the participant generated an incorrect
or false positive solution (FP). It should be noted that
the participant did not know if their proposed solution
was correct or not at the time of response (button
press) but knew only after he or she had verbalized it
and the experimenter validated it. For this comparison,
HIT trials featured true transformative reasoning. (2)
nH_HIT versus H_HIT: Insight problems typically contain
Figure 1. The flowchart
of a single trial. The hint
is presented only after
the individual fails to
solve the puzzle in the
prescribed time.
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open-ended, unstructured information. Restructuring a
problem in a way different from before is a key first step
in the process leading up to the insight. Restructuring is
internal or can be guided by external hints that constrain
the problem space. We provided a hint when the partic-
ipant failed to solve the puzzle in the prescribed time, and
contrasted EEG spectral content during the 10-sec pre-
response period on two subclasses of HIT trials: trials on
which participants came up with the correct solution by
themselves (nH_HIT, successful restructuring without the
aid of a hint) and HIT trials on which the participants
correctly solved the puzzle after the experimenter pro-
vided a hint (H_HIT, successful restructuring with the aid
of a hint). For this comparison, trials on which partic-
ipants restructured problem information on their own
(nH_HIT) contained a core component of transformative
reasoning. (3) SH versus UH: We contrasted EEG spectral
content during the 10-sec prehint and 10-sec posthint
periods between trials on which, following the external
hint, participants hit upon the correct solution (successful
hint trials or SH), and trials on which they produced
either an incorrect, noninsightful solution or no solution
at all (unsuccessful hint trials or UH). For this compari-
son, SH trials featured (correct) transformative reasoning.
(4) ‘‘Aha!’’ versus ‘‘non-Aha!’’: Upon responding, partic-
ipants indicated whether they had solved the problem
with insight (rating  8) or without (rating 	 3) on a 10-
point scale (see Methods). It is to be noted that a
problem solver might rate an incorrect solution as highly
insightful or a correct solution as noninsightful: 38%
(21/55) of FPs were ‘‘Aha!’’ solutions and 33% (17/50) of
HITs were ‘‘non-Aha!’’ solutions. We selected features of
the TFR corresponding to transformative thought that
were consistently observed on the above comparisons.
For each of the four pairs of comparisons, statistical
tests (two-sided) were performed between the time–
frequency contents on each electrode region of the se-
lected two conditions. Statistical analysis was performed
with windows spanning 500 msec 
 2 Hz in the time–
frequency domain with a 250 msec 
 1 Hz overlap.
Because the number of epochs varied across participant
and condition, we assumed that the original observa-
tions Ei(j, v) and ej(v) were homoscedastic, as the
variances of the spectral estimators got smaller with in-
creasing number of epochs. To incorporate this feature
into the statistical analysis, we used a more robust, hetero-
scedastically consistent paired quasi-t test (Zeileis, 2004).
PARAFAC Analysis
For each comparison, the statistical analysis resulted in a
three-dimensional statistical (F values) time–frequency
maps of Electrode 
 Frequency 
 Time. The statistical
maps were subsequently decomposed by parallel-factor
analysis (PARAFAC) (Morup, Hansen, Herrmann, Parnas,
& Arnfred, 2006), which selects the components of the
map that explain the largest amount of signal variance.
That is to say, PARAFAC zooms in on the scalp topog-
raphy, spectral frequency, and temporal dynamics that
provide maximum discriminatory power between two
compared conditions. Using PARAFAC analysis, we sum-
marized the time–frequency energy variations, which
were expressed in t2 test values, by decomposing them
into Space (or electrode) 
 Frequency 
 Time atoms.
The t2 test values for each channel were combined in a
three-way array X (I 
 J 
 K ) of Space 
 Frequency 

Time and the PARAFAC model was formulated as:
xijk ¼
XF
f¼1
aif bjf ckf þ >ijk;
where F is the number of factors. This formula corre-
sponds to the assumption that a given frequency signa-
ture bf of strength cf in time has been assorted in the
electrodes by af. Due to the fact that PARAFAC vector
loadings are unique to within a factor of scale and
permutation, we normalized each vector to a maximum
value of 1. The PARAFAC model is related to higher-
dimensional principal component analysis, but offers
better statistical properties (uniqueness, rotation etc.)
than principal component analysis.
Parameters of the PARAFAC model fit were estimated
by minimizing the squared error of the fitted model with
an alternating least squares algorithm (Bro, 1998). We
ensured that a stable solution was reached by using
random orthogonalized values for initialization and by
repeating the algorithm three times followed by visual
comparison of the results. The optimum number of
factors was determined by core consistency diagnostic,
the sum-squared error, number of iterations, and 13-fold
cross-validation (Bro, 1998; see supplementary Figure 1).
It might be noted that the PARAFAC model was applied
on F values, not on the raw TFR values. This approach
emphasizes the most robust differences between two
compared conditions, and thus, more localized spatial
maps are likely. Other effects, which are common to
both conditions (see Figure 5 of Morup et al., 2006 for
an illustration of this approach) cancel out as a result.
RESULTS
For each pair of comparisons (see Methods), our analysis
consisted of three steps: (i) estimating time–frequency
structure of the induced oscillatory activity for both
conditions, followed by (ii) investigating their statistical
differences in terms of F test values, and finally, (iii)
applying PARAFAC analysis on these F values.
We briefly describe here these steps for the compar-
ison HIT versus FP. Figure 2 shows the difference (HIT
minus FP) TFR plots for all 30 electrode locations. As
compared to FP responses, HIT responses show two
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robust effects: decrease in beta band activity and in-
crease in gamma band activity, and these effects are
most prominent at FC6 and PO3, respectively (note also
the white rectangles indicating the zones of statistical
significance as determined by the F values). Next, these
three-dimensional data (Electrode 
 Time 
 Frequency)
of F values are decomposed by PARAFAC analysis into
the sum of four factors (see supplementary figure),
where each factor has three modes: spatial, temporal,
and spectral (see Methods). We find that the earlier elec-
trode locations (FC6, PO3) also appear to prominence in
the factors (Factor 1 and Factor 4). Other similarities can
be observed as well, for example, strong alpha suppres-
sion, for HIT responses, in the TFR plot at electrode Fz
at around t = 5 sec and a very localized profile with
similar space–time–frequency signatures for Factor 3.
We show another example on linking a factor with
actual TFR representations. For the comparison nH_HIT
versus H_HIT, Factor 3 shows a spatial mode with sharp
localization around F8 (see supplementary figures), and
its temporal and spectral modes are displayed in Fig-
ure 3B and C, respectively. The zone of significance in
the TFR plots of F8 is shown in Figure 2A and is remark-
ably consistent with the two modes as described earlier.
Figure 2. Morlet wavelet based TFRs of the induced oscillatory activity for correct (HIT) minus incorrect (FP) responses. The x-axis represents
time, the y-axis represents frequency. All 30 electrodes are shown with their locations mentioned on top of each subplot. Red (blue) indicates
increased spectral power for HIT (FP) and white rectangles denote zones of significance ( p < .05). Moment of response is at t = 0. The two
magnified TFR plots depict the most conspicuous gamma band effect and beta band effect at electrode locations FC6, right fronto-central,
and PO3, left parieto-occipital, respectively.
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These all together demonstrate the efficacies of PARAFAC
analysis on F values to identify the region of interest in a
higher-dimensional dataset.
Next, we applied the PARAFAC analysis on all four com-
parisons, and not surprisingly, it yielded features unique
to each comparison (supplementary figures). However,
we strategically focused only on those features that were
common and consistent, in terms of frequency band and
the associated ERS/ERD changes, across all comparisons.
Because transformative reasoning is also common across
all comparisons, this cognitive process is likely to be
reflected by the earlier common neural features.
As hypothesized in the Introduction, there was a
decrease in spectral power in the beta band in the
parietal and parieto-occipital areas on all four compar-
isons. Factor 4 of the signal variance on the HIT versus
FP trials was dominated by differences in the left parieto-
occipital region (PO3; Figure 4A) in three distinct fre-
quency bands, but significantly reduced power for HIT
trials was found only in the beta frequency band [15–
20 Hz; FP > HIT, F(1, 11) = 10.39, p < .0042]. Factor 2
of the signal variance on the nH_HIT versus H_HIT trials
showed steady, significantly reduced power on the
nH_HIT trials as compared to the H_HIT trials in the
Figure 3. Linking PARAFAC analysis with individual TFRs. (A) TFR
of the induced oscillatory activity at electrode location F8 for correct
responses without hint (nH_HIT) minus correct responses with
hint (H_HIT). The white rectangles denote the zones of significance
( p < .05). (B) The temporal mode and (C) the spectral mode of one
of the factors produced by the PARAFAC decomposition for the
identical pair of comparison, nH_HIT versus H_HIT (see
supplementary figure for details). Note the time and spectral
information in A is essentially captured by B and C, respectively.
Figure 4. Decrease in
spectral power in the beta
frequency band in the
parietal and parieto-occipital
regions corresponding to
transformative thought. The
spatial (leftmost panel),
spectral (middle panel), and
temporal (rightmost panel)
modes of the PARAFAC
decomposition of F values
highlighting decrease in beta
power are depicted between
conditions of the following
four comparisons (A) HIT vs.
FP, (B) nHIT vs. H_HIT,
(C) SH vs. UH, and (D) ‘‘Aha!’’
vs. ‘‘non-Aha!’’ (see
supplementary figures for
a complete description of
the main components of
the PARAFAC model). The
percentages on the left denote
the proportion of the variance
accounted for by the particular
component for the given
pairwise comparison. The red
line in the temporal mode
panel represents the instant
participants pressed the
button to propose a solution;
the green line represents the
instant at which the hint was
presented. The intensities
represent the two-sided
statistical significance of
the mode.
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upper beta [ fc = 23.5 Hz, p < .004 (at Cz and t =
5.75 sec)] and lower-frequency bands ( fc = 9.5 Hz,
p < .014, t = 6.25 sec) over a wide expanse of the
brain, but mainly over the right parieto-central and tem-
poral regions (Figure 4B). Factor 2 of the signal variance
on the SH versus UH trials showed several differences,
among which was significantly reduced power in the left
frontal regions (mainly F3) in the beta ( fc = 17.5 Hz,
p < .002, t = 2.5 sec) frequencies (Figure 4C). Factor 3
of the signal variance on the ‘‘Aha!’’ versus ‘‘non-Aha!’’
trials was a significant reduction in power in the beta
frequency band in the central–parietal regions (‘‘non-
Aha!’’ > ‘‘Aha!’’, Pz, fc = 21.5 Hz, p < .0001; Figure 4D);
there was also significant increased power in the lower
alpha (C3, fc = 7.5 Hz, p < .007) frequency band for
‘‘Aha!’’ as compared to ‘‘non-Aha!’’ solutions.
We also observed a change in gamma power in the
right anterior region as hypothesized, although the
results were somewhat less consistent than the beta
band decrease. Factor 1 of the difference in HITs versus
FPs showed a conspicuous increase for HIT trials in the
right fronto-central region [FC6; HIT > FP, F(1, 11) =
6.75, p < .025] in the gamma frequency ( fc = 45.5 Hz)
range (Figure 5A). Similarly, Factor 1 of the difference
between ‘‘Aha!’’ and ‘‘non-Aha!’’ was significant over the
right frontal region [‘‘Aha!’’ > ‘‘non-Aha!,’’ fc = 39.5 Hz,
F4 ( p < .008); F8 ( p < .002, t = 1.25 sec); Figure 5D]
in the broad gamma frequency band (30–70 Hz). Factor 1
of the difference in neural activity between SH and UH
depicted a gradually increasing difference in the gamma
band (31–70 Hz) starting from hint-onset over right
centro-temporal regions (Figure 5C), but the direction
of the effect was opposite [UH > SH; CP6: F(1, 11) =
11.04, p < .0035; FC2: p < .03; C4: p < .023] compared
with the previous comparisons. Factor 1 of the compar-
ison nH_HIT versus H_HIT indicated greater power
exclusively in the gamma band ( fc = 43.5 Hz) for the
condition that contains more transformative thought
(nH_HIT), and the difference was over the left parieto-
occipital region (PO3; nH_HIT > H_HIT, p < .006; Fig-
ure 5B). In summary, there was an increase in broad
band gamma power in the right fronto-central and fron-
tal electrode regions on two of the four comparisons but
the results were not as consistent as the beta band de-
crease in terms of brain region and direction of change
(increase/decrease) in spectral power (see Discussion).
DISCUSSION
Our EEG study of the neural basis of insight and trans-
formative thinking during problem solving has yielded
results that hold across a diverse range of conditions and
comparisons.
Figure 5. Change in spectral
power in the gamma frequency
band corresponding to
transformative thought. The
spatial (leftmost panel),
spectral (middle panel), and
temporal (rightmost panel)
modes of the PARAFAC
decomposition of F values
highlighting changes in gamma
power are illustrated between
conditions of the following
comparisons (A) HIT vs. FP,
(B) nHIT vs. H_HIT, (C) SH
vs. UH, and (D) ‘‘Aha!’’ vs.
‘‘non-Aha!’’.
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As hypothesized, there was a decrease in beta band
(13–30 Hz) power in the parietal, parieto-occipital, and
centro-temporal brain regions when the person was pre-
dominantly engaged in transformative reasoning. Cog-
nitive processing is sometimes associated with change
in beta power (Pesonen et al., 2007; Bastiaansen et al.,
2005; Weiss & Rappelsberger, 1998). Further, decreased
beta power in the parietal and parieto-occipital areas is
seen in conjunction with modality-independent increase
in memory load (Pesonen et al., 2006, 2007), which is
believed to be necessary for transformative thought. Our
results thus strongly suggest a prominent role for beta
oscillations in transformative reasoning tasks that criti-
cally involve semantic memory.
Enhanced power in the gamma band (30–70 Hz) and
increased involvement of the right cerebral hemisphere
(right frontal, fronto-central, and centro-temporal re-
gions) were also observed when participants correctly
solved the insight problem and when they reported
experiencing ‘‘Aha!’’ The right prefrontal cortex is acti-
vated on problems requiring set-shift transformation
(Goel & Vartanian, 2005; Miller & Tippett, 1996), which
is a type of restructuring, and on tasks involving sequen-
tial thinking when a belief–logic conflict causes a change
in the reasoning process (Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan,
2000). Further, the right hemisphere appears to help
make available a set of alternative and less probable
word meanings in a lexical task (Coney & Evans, 2000),
which corresponds to the generation of multiple solu-
tions in insight problems. Curiously, gamma power was
lower on successful (hit) trials than unsuccessful trials in
the immediate time period following hint presentation.
One account is that the hint constrained the search
space to the point that the posthint period did not
require true transformative reasoning on some trials.
The posthint comparison was the only one of four com-
parisons that did not include the moment of response
and an alternative account is that enhanced gamma
power may be a neural correlate of the moment of
subjective insight but not of the restructuring and other
processes of transformative reasoning that precede it.
Moreover, the differences in spatial location of the in-
crease (FC6, F8) versus decrease (CP6, C4) in gamma
power suggest the presence of two distinct gamma
response systems. Additional experiments are needed
to resolve these issues. Nonetheless, on the basis of past
and present findings, we can reasonably claim that the
right prefrontal region and gamma band oscillations are
engaged in transformative reasoning.
Of critical importance, the present results support our
fourth and final hypothesis, namely, that the change in
oscillatory activity underlying transformative reasoning
represents unconscious cognitive, not affective, processes:
In contrast to the fact that affective ‘‘Aha!’’ processes
typically occur around the moment of response (Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004), changes in spectral power corre-
sponding to transformative thinking in our study occurred
several seconds prior to response. Examples include
enhanced gamma band activity for HIT versus FP solu-
tions in the right fronto-central brain region 8 ! 1 sec
prior to the response (Figure 3A), decreased beta band
activity on nH_HIT versus H_HIT trials 6 sec prior to
the response (Figure 2C), and enhanced upper alpha
(13.5 Hz) activity in the right parieto-occipital region
7 sec before presentation of the hint on SH versus UH
trials (Factor 3 in Supplementary Figure 3). Insight prob-
lem solvers are usually unable to report the internal
mental processes that precede their insightful solution
(Ohlsson, 1992) or be joyful before solving the problem
on hand; therefore, the changes in oscillatory rhythms
that occur well before the conscious response are un-
likely to correspond to feelings of joy or relief that ac-
company problem solution but rather to subconscious
(and possibly automatic) mental recombinations of ap-
parently distant yet remotely connected representations
prior to solution (Simonton, 1999; Seifert et al., 1995;
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987).
Our findings also lend support to the proposal that
prior brain state, namely, the level of mental prepared-
ness, contributes to later restructuring of the problem
representation: There was a difference in brain activity
even before the hint was presented between puzzles that
were eventually solved and those that were not. Unlike in
Kounios et al. (2008), no significant differences were
observed over the time period before problem presenta-
tion; differences were observed over the time period after
problem presentation but before presentation of the hint.
This effectively argues for the existence of a brain state
that is receptive to the incorporation of new information
(hint) with an existing cognitive representation.
Thus far, we have focused on commonalities in oscil-
latory patterns of brain activity across the four compar-
isons. Clearly, there are also patterns that are unique to
each (Supplementary Figures 2–5). For instance, gamma
band activity in the right parieto-occipital region is
greater for ‘‘Aha!’’ versus ‘‘non-Aha!’’ solutions (Supple-
mentary Figure 5). This result is compatible with reports
of emotionally loaded stimuli enhancing gamma band ac-
tivity in the right parietal region (Aftanas, Reva, Varlamov,
Pavlov, & Makhnev, 2003; Keil et al., 2001), similar find-
ings dissociating affective from cognitive processes in the
context of a study of neural correlates of humor (Goel &
Dolan, 2001), and with our point that the reasoning
leading up to the insight and the resulting ‘‘Aha!’’ do not
have identical neural substrates.
Let us offer a few critical remarks. First, our partic-
ipants moved their hand to press a button upon solving
a problem. Beta ERD is often reported as a neural
correlate for movement preparation and execution;
therefore, one might argue that our principal finding
of beta ERD corresponds to preparatory motor activity
rather than transformative reasoning. However, both
conditions of each pairwise comparison either conclud-
ed with an identical button press (HITs vs. FPs, nH_HITs
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vs. H_HITs, HRs vs. LRs) or were marked by a common
event (i.e., hint in SH vs.UH). Thus, preparatory motor
activity was either common within a given comparison,
or absent altogether. Also, preparatory motor activity, or
the readiness potential as it is called sometimes, is
mainly represented by frequencies below 3 Hz (Libet,
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Kornhuber & Deecke,
1965), whereas our effects were mainly in the higher
beta (21–30 Hz) and gamma frequencies (>30 Hz). In
sum, beta ERD cannot correspond to motor preparation.
Second, our choice of analysis measure needs clarifica-
tion. One way of analyzing high-dimensional data such
as ours is to treat each channel, frequency, and time
instant in isolation and statistically measure the reliabil-
ity of the pairwise difference in signal at each point of
this high-dimensional space separately. Controlling for
multiple comparisons, one will typically obtain isolated
points in time, space, and frequency that significantly
differ between the two conditions being tested. Given
that there is no a priori hypothesis that is so specific
in time, frequency, or space, measurement resolution
per se is not so precise, and time instants, frequencies,
and especially electrodes are not isolated, independent
units, it is more reasonable to think about the neural
correlate of transformative reasoning in terms of clusters
within high-dimensional space instead. PARAFAC is es-
sentially a data exploratory tool (Morup, Hansen, &
Arnfred, 2007) whose strength lies in identifying regions
where one might find differences in space, time, and
frequency between two conditions. Raw F statistics were
input to the PARAFAC analysis to identify clusters of
statistically significant regions in this space. The results
of the PARAFAC analysis need to be validated with the
raw time–frequency plots, which we did (Figures 1, 2,
and 3). In order to cross-validate our PARAFAC findings,
we reanalyzed our raw TFR data on isolated units of
frequency and space with a multivariate statistical test
(Hemmelmann, Horn, Su¨sse, Vollandt, & Weiss, 2005)
based on false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg,
1995), which corrects for multiple comparisons; again,
beta band effects emerged as the most prominent sta-
tistically significant characteristic of transformative reason-
ing among the four comparisons. In sum, PARAFAC is a
useful, powerful way of isolating significant portions of
high-dimensional EEG data. Third, EEG has poor spatial
resolution; results localizing function to discrete brain
areas must be interpreted with caution. Moreover, the in-
volvement of subcortical brain structures, such as the hip-
pocampus, in insight problem solving (Luo & Niki, 2003)
is underemphasized in the EEG. Fourth, each pairwise
comparison is unique in some ways. Therefore, one must
be cautious before claiming beta and gamma oscillations
are the neural substrate of insight. On the other hand, one
can reasonably claim that the effects are more consistent
and robust in these frequency bands. Finally, our puzzles
vary in cognitive content; nonetheless, all share one ele-
ment: Each requires transformative thought.
In conclusion, our findings indicate that insight is a
distinct spectral, spatial, and temporal pattern of uncon-
scious neural activity corresponding to presolution cog-
nitive processes, and not to one’s self-assessment of
their insight or the emotional ‘‘Aha!’’ that accompanies
problem solution. Future studies will determine the
generality of our findings to other classes of problems
and how modulations of neural activity patterns by
clever behavioral or brain computer interface manipu-
lations affect insightfulness.
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